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The contemporary rebound and recovery1 of the Zimbabwe economy comes on the 
back of more than a decade of economic decline and an increase in levels of 
poverty. Since the late 1990s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita had peaked 
at US$574 in 1998 and by the time the inclusive government was formed in 2009 this 
had nearly halved and was estimated to be about US$284. Reasons for the decline 
are many and varied but in the main relate to the cumulative effects of economic and 
political governance challenges prevailing in the country at the time.2 The 
catastrophic decline in GDP per capita triggered a rise in income poverty that eroded 
many of the post-independence welfare gains. This paper analyses the drivers of 
poverty in rural and urban Zimbabwe. It draws its evidence principally from the 
Protracted Relief Programme (PRP)-LIME Surveys but also analyses evidence from 
other major poverty surveys and reports. Based on this analysis the paper draws out 
some key lessons learnt and the implications for future poverty reduction 
interventions3.   
Emerging Lessons after Eight Years of PRP 
The Protracted Relief Programme (PRP) was launched by the UK Department for 
International Development (DFID) in 2004. Phase I (2004-08) reached 1.5 million 
people. Phase II (2008-2010) helped to increase coverage to at least 2 million in 
both urban and rural areas.  The second phase was a multi-donor funded 
programme, financed by Australian Aid (AusAID), Danish International Development 
Agency (DANIDA), the European Union (EU), the Embassy of the Kingdom of 
Netherlands (EKN), the Norwegian Agency for Development (NORAD), the UK 
Department for International Development (DFID) and the World Bank. The PRP 
aimed to reduce extreme poverty in Zimbabwe and, through various programming 
interventions, sought to prevent suffering and at the same time build the capacity of 
beneficiary households to graduate out of poverty. This was done through a mixture 
of emergency, recovery and development interventions. The balance, in terms of 
resource allocation, between emergency, recovery and development, has changed 
in response to the evolving context in Zimbabwe. In the current phase (2011-2012) 
                                                          
1
 Real GDP growth rate for 2011 estimated at just above 6 per cent while in 2009 and 2010 it had grown by 5.7 
and 8.1 per cent  respectively 
2
 See Chimhowu et al (2010) 
3
 Appendix 1 gives a detailed description of the scope of this work, the questions and methodology used. 
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the interventions are now more developmental, building the sustainability and 
resilience of the livelihood systems of the very poor people in Zimbabwe.  From 
analysis of the combined experiences, the following key areas of learning for the 
future have been identified: 
Many Groups in Poverty 
The PRP evidence shows a multiplicity of groups living in poverty. There are more 
rural than poor but within each of these there are internal variations. In both rural 
areas the poorest are often the groups with health (chronically ill or disabled), age 
(orphans and grandparents), gender (female).  
Multiple Drivers of Poverty 
Evidence from the 23 PRP-LIME sites shows that the programme was dealing with 
multiple drivers of poverty. For the rural the socio-economic drivers included lack of 
access to and capability to use productive assets, limited opportunities for off farm 
employment, social exclusion and spatial disadvantage. These combined to make 
livelihood pursuits limited, unsustainable or simply inaccessible. For the urban 
programme, the main drivers related to lack of quality employment and opportunities 
to make a living through self-employment. A large number were driven into poverty 
through non-developmental politics and loss of livelihoods.  
Productivity Growth and Conservation Agriculture 
The PRP has demonstrated very clearly that productivity growth is key to raising 
rural incomes and providing pathways out of poverty. The biggest problem for 
smallholder agriculture has been low productivity. What the PRP has demonstrated 
is that by facilitating input support households gain an ability to use their land to 
better themselves. Conservation agriculture is an example of where PRP 
interventions have increased productivity for smallholder farmers.  Many of the 
households that had never produced a surplus have managed to, are food secure 
and are looking to participate in markets. For urban areas, the PRP experience 
clearly shows that access to quality employment or opportunities to trade can make 
a difference. 
Institution Building  
During the economic crisis provision of public goods and services was weakened as 
the state capacity to provide these declined due to budget constraints. The PRP has 
shown the importance of building stronger local level institutions and capacity to co-
ordinate and „do development‟ with the co-operation rather than direction of the 
state. It is a way to reach people when state institutions at the centre do not work 
well or are paralysed by lack of resources. That way development does not stop but 
continues through local level non-state actors. Examples of PRP initiatives that 
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attempted to fill the vacuum in these services are the volunteer–led Farmer Field 
Schools that filled a void left by under resourced extension services and the „para 
vets‟ who provided services to livestock farmers. Similarly, many of the home based 
care groups emerged to provide much needed local level support for the chronically 
ill. The process of building these community level institutions has created a new crop 
of trained development actors actively making a difference in their communities.  
Embracing the Mosaic of Livelihoods 
PRP recognized and followed the 23 Livelihood Zones which have been developed 
by the Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee (ZIMVAC) in its 
programming. Evidence from the PRP LIME data suggests that such an approach 
allowed PRP to embrace difference and develop interventions that suited the 
different settings like the rural to urban to the finer distinction between household 
types at a local level. The PRP allowed sufficient flexibility for the development of a 
mosaic of locally defined projects within the programme. It allowed experimentation 
and embraced difference and learning across the project areas while retaining 
overall focus. This was a major strength.   
Asset Building Matters when Incomes are Slow to Recover 
For many rural communities poverty is defined through access to and ownership of 
productive assets. Developing an asset building dimension to PRP programming has 
allowed households to not only work on stabilising their livelihoods but also begin the 
process of welfare enhancing wealth creation. There is evidence from PRP that the 
transfer of wealth creating assets, such as small livestock, gives beneficiaries the 
confidence and security to begin investing and experiment with other livelihood 
options. As the food situation has begun to stabilise some of the PRP beneficiaries 
are using the „liquid‟ assets (goats, chickens) to generate cash income rather than 
for food. Similarly, one of the most popular PRP initiatives has been „Mukando‟ 
(village based/community micro savings and lending groups), which has begun to 
spur the growth of micro enterprises and a necessary diversification out of 
agriculture. Mukando has also provided PRP with a local community driven exit 
strategy that is filling a funding gap likely to emerge after PRP.   
Apart from these wealth creating assets, PRP has also had a focus on human capital 
development. Many individuals have gained essential skills- through education and 
training driven by local needs not from colleges. The emergence of a new cadre of 
well trained development para-practitioners often working voluntarily is a residual but 
positive effect.  This is a form of asset building for poverty reduction that empowers 
individuals and communities to, within limits, deal with development challenges as 
they emerge rather than wait for the state or other external actors.  
12 
 
Social Protection and the Vulnerable Groups 
PRP and other actors experimented and piloted a new generation of social 
protection and in so doing initiated evidence based policy dialogue that led to the 
new framework for social protection being adopted by the state.  It was effective in 
experimenting and demonstrating the effectiveness of social transfers in enhancing 
welfare outcomes. This is a policy innovation that plays both a redistributive and 
protective function. There is evidence from PRP LIME data that the cash transfers 
have contributed significantly to household incomes helping to stabilise consumption 
and meeting some of the cash needs especially in rural areas. Positive welfare 
outcomes of social transfers are clear in all PRP areas with school attendance in 
households getting cash transfers and assistance under BEAM being a third higher 
than households without. 
Re-thinking and Reimagining Urban Programming 
Most of the PRP has had a very logical and deliberate focus on rural poverty. This is 
where three quarters of all poor people in Zimbabwe still live. As urbanisation of 
poverty accelerated especially after Operation Murambatsvina4, PRP began to 
expand its activities to cover urban areas. There is evidence from PRP LIME data 
that urban programming was highly effective while it lasted. Its „palliative‟ dimension 
was effective in saving lives especially in post 2004 when the economic collapse 
affected employment and food markets. Once a semblance of stability was restored 
through the formation of the inclusive government there is no evidence that urban 
programming in PRP remained as focused in ensuring a soft landing for the poor as 
they made the transition from „crisis‟ to „stability‟. If anything can be learnt perhaps it 
is that there is need to rethink new strategies for dealing with small but „very deep‟ 
pockets of urban poverty in an urban economy that is not generating quality formal 
employment. More specifically there is need for innovative thinking on the forms of 
social protection that can work in urban Zimbabwe where there are small 
concentrations of deep poverty located in an environment where fees and rents are 
often tenfold those of the rural environments were social protection measures do not 




                                                          
4
 In 2005 an estimated 700 000 mainly urban dwellers were left homeless and destitute after their „irregularly‟ built homes were 







1 Scope and Structure of the Paper 
What Are Drivers Of Poverty And What Have We Learnt? 
This paper analyses the drivers of poverty in rural and urban Zimbabwe. It draws its 
evidence principally from the Protracted Relief Programme-LIME Surveys5 but also 
analyses evidence from other poverty surveys and reports that include: Income 
Consumption and Expenditure Surveys (ICES) of 1990/1 and 1995/6; the Poverty 
Assessment Study Surveys (PASS) of 1995 and 2003; ZIMVAC Reports (2001-
2011); Multiple Indicator Monitoring Surveys (MIMS), Moving Forward in Zimbabwe 
Poverty Survey 2011 and the Demographic Health Surveys (1988, 1994, 1999,2005-
6 and 2010-2011).  Based on this analysis the paper draws out some key lessons 
learnt so far and the implications for future poverty reduction interventions6.  The 
paper divides into six main sections. Section one gives an overview of the 
contemporary poverty discourses and establishes a local understanding of poverty. 
This is followed by a discussion of what we know about poverty patterns (in space 
and time) in Zimbabwe. Section three looks at the covariate drivers of poverty while 
section four analyses the idiosyncratic drivers. Section five draws out the key 
lessons learnt while section six looks at the implications of the key lessons for 
poverty reduction policy and practice in Zimbabwe and beyond. 
2 Understanding Poverty in Zimbabwe 
Unlike many development concepts that lack equivalence in African vernacular 
languages, the term poverty has a very direct local expression. Many of the local 
languages in Zimbabwe have terms that locate it socially and relate to it. The Shona 
word „Urombo‟ or „Nhamo‟ and the Ndebele word „Ubuyanga‟ capture its essence. 
Both main vernacular languages do recognise the time duration and depth 
dimensions of poverty7. Analytically many in Zimbabwe relate poverty to assets 
                                                          
5
 Longitudinal Approaches to Impact Assessment, Monitoring and Evaluation (LIME) is the main means for collecting data for 
monitoring and evaluation in PRP. This is done through a robust quasi-experimental design monitoring 28 project sites. 
6
 Appendix 1 gives a detailed description of the scope of this work, the questions and methodology used. 
7
 In Shona the concept of chronic poverty is captured in phrases like nhamo yemadzinza (poverty passed down 
across generations) or nhamo inokandira mazai (poverty that lays eggs)  
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which are often seen as indicators of wealth or an ability to avoid poverty. In many 
rural areas it is land and livestock particularly cattle that define a households wealth 
status8. 
The 1981 Riddell Commission of Inquiry into Incomes and Pricing9  was probably the 
first systematic attempt to understand issues of deprivation and welfare in 
Zimbabwe. Prior to this, much of the work was ad hoc and consisted mostly of 
academic studies focusing on the impacts of resource alienation, especially land, on 
the ability of Africans to make a living. Much of the poverty discourses prior to 
independence were therefore subsumed under the broader theme of the effects of 
settler colonial policies on the welfare of the African population. A clear illustration of 
this is Roder (1964); Arrighi (1970); Palmer (1976); Riddell (1976) and Whitsun 
Foundation (1976). All relate the poverty and deprivation in the then tribal trust lands 
to a combination of land and market alienation and a lack of knowledge and skills. 
Although the 1981 Riddell Commission called for systematic collection of data on 
poverty, it was not until 1990 that systematic poverty measurement started with the 
ICES of 1990/91. Until then, most of the work done internally within government was 
based on the Central Statistical Office setting the poverty datum line upon which 
minimum wage negotiations were based. A tradition of using the money metric 
poverty measures has therefore always had a very narrow remit with a bias toward 
wage employment rather than being used to set broad based strategies to fight 
poverty. This position pushed by the bureaucratic elites meant that as long as 
poverty was framed this way, it remained an incomes issue that could be settled in 
wage negotiations. There was an underlying rationale to this. The Riddell 
Commission Report had highlighted the plight of the „working poor‟ and incomes 
inequality as major issues that needed to be resolved.  
Sitting alongside this „money metric‟ conceptualisation of poverty, a more widely held 
narrative (especially among lay citizens and political elites) is an asset based view.  
Until 2000 the view expressed in almost all official development plans has been that 
poverty in Zimbabwe is a direct result of land alienation. This it was argued was at 
the core of the poverty question in Zimbabwe and could only be solved through 
redistribution of land.10 In the post-2000 period a more plural discourse has emerged 
that sees poverty as a function of idiosyncratic and covariate factors.  This chimes 
                                                          
8
 The PRP-LIME reports on rural wealth ranking are a good example of how locals try to analyse and 
understand poverty and progress out of poverty.  
9
 See GoZ(1981) 
10
 See for example the Growth with Equity Documents; Transitional Development Plan; The first Five Year Plan and the Second Five Year 
Plan; ESAP and ZIMPREST   
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more with the global discourses that identify structural and personal traits that keep 
people in poverty11. 
3 Measuring Poverty in Zimbabwe 
Officially four nationally representative surveys have been completed since 1980. A 
fifth living standards survey is currently under way. Data from Income Consumption 
and Expenditure Surveys (ICES) of 1990 and 1995 respectively and from the 
Poverty Assessment Study Surveys (PASS) of 1995 and 2003 form basis of much of 
what we know about poverty in Zimbabwe. Both the ICES and PASS are not directly 
comparable due to methodological differences.12 Apart from these surveys, specialist 
data bases like the Multiple Indicator Monitoring Survey (MIMS), ZIMVAC and PRP-
LIME also provide scope for exploring poverty in Zimbabwe. The only panel data set 
tracking welfare in rural Zimbabwe has been running since 1982.13 The Moving 
Forward in Zimbabwe project at the University of Zimbabwe working with ZIMSTAT 
also completed a poverty in 2011 that sheds light on contemporary poverty trends. 
In official discourses, there is an acceptance that poverty is multidimensional 
although much of the evidence upon which decisions are made still derives from 
money metric measures.  While the Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency 
(ZIMSTAT) has shown a willingness to broaden its understanding of poverty, their 
main instrument for decision making however still remains the poverty lines. In fact 
the 2003 Poverty Assessment Study Survey showed this willingness to broaden the 
understanding of poverty to beyond income and consumption. However the headline 
figures remained dominated by the money metric measures and there is little 
evidence that the multidimensional elements captured influenced decisions making.  
ZIMSTAT draw a distinction between the Food Poverty Line (FPL) which captures 
food poverty and the Total Consumption Poverty Line (TCPL). The FPL is defined as 
a lack or inability of individuals or households to meet a standard consumption level 
considered necessary to acquire minimum nutritional level pegged at 2070 kilo 
calories per person per day but often rounded up to 2100 (PASS, 2003, and WHO). 
This nutritional requirement can be obtained from a number of food items which vary 
greatly across the country. These food items form a national food basket whose 
                                                          
11
 The Chronic Poverty Research Centre identifies five traps that keep people in poverty namely: insecurity, 
limited citizenship, spatial disadvantage, social discrimination and poor work opportunities as 
12 The two PASS surveys used different food items compromising comparability of the data. The 1995 PASS survey used two baskets - 
urban and rural - with 16 food items but the 2003 PASS used a basket consisting of 30 food items drawn from the 1995 ICES. Recalculation 
of the 1995 food basket has allowed some level of comparability between the two surveys. 
 
13
 Bill Kinsey has been conducting a panel study of resettled households in Zimbabwe and has built a 
knowledge hub that allows analysis of poverty dynamics  
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value is then determined using the prevailing market prices to come up with a 
money-metric Food Poverty Line (FPL). When the value of non-food items is added 
a total consumption poverty line (TCPL) is obtained. Consumption of food with a 
monetary value below the FPL means the individual or the household is poor. On the 
other hand if total consumption of food and non-food items is below food poverty line 
the individual or household is considered to be „very poor‟ while total consumption 
above FPL but below TCPL then one is considered „poor‟ and above TCPL then one 
becomes „non-poor‟.  
Apart from this official endorsement of the money metric measures and tacit 
acceptance of multidimensional understanding of poverty, non-state actors 
especially donor agencies and NGOs have embraced and have adopted multi-
dimensional concept of poverty. The UNDP‟s multidimensional poverty index (MPI) is 
a good example of this as it incorporates education, health and living standards. It 
goes beyond income and consumption and looks at welfare outcomes drawing a 
distinction between severe poverty and vulnerability.  
Similarly, the PRP-LIME data on which this paper draws did not use the official 
poverty lines but instead went beyond the income and consumption analysis to 
embrace participatory assessments of welfare conditions. The PRP uses multiple 
indicators that allow it to identify poverty on thresholds as follows: 
 The most deprived households are deemed to be under the survival 
threshold, which is when its members consume less than 2,100 kcal per 
person per day plus survival non food items (cost of preparing food, cost of 
lighting, milling fees, and cost of water for human consumption).  This is 
similar to (but not necessarily the same as) the ZIMSTAT Total Consumption 
Poverty Line.  
 The next threshold is the livelihood protection threshold where survival costs 
plus costs associated with access to services (health, education), costs of 
maintaining productive activities and costs of supporting a locally acceptable 
standard of living are met.  
 The livelihood promotion threshold is a developmental target based on the 
wealth profile and corresponding food and income levels of households that 
maintain their productive expenditure in face of long term hazards/shocks.  
 
Embedded within this understanding is the notion that households can graduate or 
regress from one threshold to another. Looked at historically, this means much of 
what PRP did was mainly to enable households to make this transition across the 
thresholds. In the next section we look at the patterns of poverty in PRP areas and 
also draw inferences from other national surveys.  
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4 Patterns of Poverty in Zimbabwe 
By the time the inclusive government was formed in 2009, there was no doubt that a 
majority of Zimbabweans where not only living in poverty but had endured it for close 
to a decade (Chimhowu et al 2011). Evidence from PRP-LIME data backs this up. 
Table 1 is a summary table showing results of wealth ranking done in the PRP 
districts between July 2009 and June 2010. The wealth ranking tables suggest that 
60 per cent of the households are classified as very poor or poor and only 20 per 
cent could be classified as better off.14 
  
Table 1 Wealth Ranking Outcomes in PRP Project Districts 2010 
District Site Wealth group Per Cent 
Very Poor Poor Middle Better Off 
Binga 15 40 30 15 
Bulawayo* 22 38 27 13 
Bulima 30 40 20 10 
Chimanimani 16 64 13 7 
Chitungwiza* 38 30 27 5 
Chivi 10 32 38 10 
Gokwe 38 40 14 8 
Gweru* 35 45 10 10 
Insiza - 38 39 23 
Kariba - 49 36 15 
Harare* 30 25 30 15 
Makonde - 40 38 22 
Matobo 35 30 20 15 
Mazoe 42 41 12 5 
Masvingo* 20 30 40 10 
Mutare* 35 40 20 5 
Mutambara 10 45 40 5 
Nkayi 27 40 23 10 
Nyanga 50 20 - 20 
Tsholotsho  37 45 18 
UMP 20 40 27 13 
Zaka - 35 25 40 
Zvishavane 38 35 20 7 
Source: PRP-LIME District Baseline Reports 2009/2010 
*urban districts 
Definitions of who is very poor, poor or better off in PRP districts are locally defined 
during the wealth ranking and therefore can vary across the districts. In general 
however, in rural districts, wealth ranking exercise privileged ownership of productive 
assets especially land, livestock (cattle) and farm equipment. In the urban districts 
access to regular paid employment, property ownership, access to capital for 
income-generating activities, and ownership of the machinery needed for income 
                                                          
14
 This is based on a review of 23 reports on wealth ranking done in the PRP districts. It is not intended to 
present this as statistically representative of national poverty (since PRP districts were not randomly selected) 
but as indicative of what is generally accepted as the general pattern. 
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generating activities distinguished the poor from the non-poor households(PRP 
Report Number 4 2009). The most deprived households (very poor) are those that 
have no access to labour, such as those with elderly, disabled, chronically ill and 
child headed households. The poor households are those with access to sufficient 
land and labour to gain food security through cereal production and/or improved 
garden or livestock production but with serious cash constraints. The third group 
consists of the better off farmers that have labour and land but no access to credit. 
These self supporting farmers have the potential to enter into market linkage 
arrangements with private sector and produce surplus. In a majority of the districts, 
the wealth ranking identified a fourth group that is neither poor nor better off. This 
group could be called a group in transition either from being better off to being poor 
or from being poor to being better off.  
On this basis, only six of the 23 districts reviewed had 50 per cent or more of their 
households classified as being „middle‟ (neither rich nor poor) or better off (non 
poor). This is expected given that the PRP specifically targeted these areas because 
of their vulnerability. There is however evidence to suggest this pattern observed in 
PRP districts had become the general trend across the country15. Some recent 
survey work shows that as much as 70 per cent of urban households are below the 
Total Consumption Poverty Line (TCPL) and a significant 15 per cent are below the 
Food Poverty Line (FPL)16 .Data from ICES 1990 and 1995; PASS 1995 and 2003 
confirm however that a majority of people living below the poverty threshold 
continued to be in rural areas. About 8.2 million of the projected 12.7 million people 
in Zimbabwe live on about 1.321 million small farms that now occupy nearly 79 per 
cent of all agricultural land. Nearly a million of these farms are located on communal 
lands where plot size range from as little as 0.2 to as much as 10 ha. Evidence from 
PASS 1995 and 2003 show a high concentration of poverty in the rural areas as 
Table 2 shows. 
Table 2 Poverty Levels by Land Use Area 
Land use Area Total Consumption Poverty Food Poverty 
1995 2003 1995 2003 
Communal 53 66 24 51 
Resettlement Area 52 58 25 46 
Small Scale Commercial 32 58 15 43 
                                                          
15
 See MZF(2011); ZIMVAC 2010; PASS 2006 
16
 ZimVac, 2011 
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Large scale commercial 34 52 11 38 
Urban Areas 10 53 10 29 
Source: GoZ 2006 
It is clear from Table 2 that even before the 2000-2009 economic crises a majority of 
households living in communal and resettlement areas were already living in poverty,  
although many could still feed themselves. The 2003 survey data suggest a 
worsening of the welfare conditions as many of the communal households did not 
earn or grow enough to feed themselves. Table 3 presents more recent data from 
the MFZ survey completed in 2011.It is a summary of the findings based on a 
representative sample of 16 districts. 
 
 
Table 3 Poverty Incidence in Zimbabwe 2011 
        
    
Total Consumption 
Poverty   Food Poverty 
    All Urban Rural   All Urban Rural 
Poverty Incidence (%) 
 
81.6 62.6 95.1 
 
44.4 8.5 68.3 
Poverty Depth (%) 
 
52.8 27.2 71.1 
 
20.6 2.3 33.6 
Poverty Severity (%) 
 
39.2 14.9 56.7 
 
21.1 0.9 19.4 
Number of households   3,448 1,436 2,012   1,497 122 1,375 
Source: MZF Survey 
         
The MZF survey shows that poverty levels are quite high and, alarmingly so for the 
rural areas. Overall 81.6 per cent of population in the 16 surveyed districts lived 
below the total poverty line in 2011(MZF, 2011). We return to a discussion of the 
drivers of poverty in the next section suffice it to say the dramatic rise suggested by 
the MZF data can be attributed to the devastating effects of the protracted socio-
economic and political crisis experienced between 2000 and 2009. Extrapolations 
from these survey data would suggest as much as seven million out of the 8.2 million 
people in rural areas live below the total consumption line while as many as 5.5 
million live in severe poverty and are food insecure. We can estimate that 40 per 
cent (2.2 million) of those in severe poverty are chronically poor17. They have lived in 
poverty for most of their lives.  
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 There has not been an official analysis of the number of people in long term poverty in Zimbabwe ie those 
that were poor between either the ICES or the PASSes and it is beyond the scope of this paper to do so here. 
We draw out this indicative figure of 2.2million based on CPRC analysis of patterns in sub Saharan Africa. This 
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5 Poverty, Agro-ecological and Livelihood Zones 
Although done nearly 43 years ago and adjusted incrementally ever since the 
Vincent and Thomas agro-ecological zoning system still influences the official 
discourses on agricultural potential.  Some state and non-state actors have begun to 
work with livelihood zones that privilege food security.18 Many people still prefer the 
Vincent and Thomas zoning for its simplicity in spite of the fact that it is agro-centric 
and fails to take into account the many ways that people actually make a living. 
Irrespective of which zoning system is used, there is no doubt that opportunities to 
make a living in Zimbabwe vary quite significantly according to location. For rural 
livelihoods, the Vincent and Thomas Agro-ecological Zoning system shows that 
more than fifty per cent of the country lies in regions classified as being generally 
unsuitable for dry land farming without additional investment in water technology19. 
According to this, Regions IV and V are deemed too dry for crop production without 
irrigation or appropriate moisture management practices. Small grains, particularly 
millet and sorghum, can be produced in some parts of this region although seasonal 
and periodic droughts are a common feature afflicting most farm-based livelihoods. 
With changing production practices and innovations, regions IV and V have since the 
early 1980s seen increased production of high value tourism products based on 
wildlife farming. Only 38 per cent of the country is deemed to have „natural‟ farming 
potential that is often punctuated by periodic droughts once every four to five years  
With up to 74 per cent of all communal lands located in the drier regions 4 and 5 it is 
not too difficult to see why this marginality when combined with remoteness and 
relatively basic production technologies compromises the ability of families in the 
marginal lands to make a living and stay out of poverty. Evidence suggests that 
many of the people that cannot make a decent living off the land are based in the 
drier agro-ecological regions where lack of investment in better adapted production 
methods and water infrastructure has made agriculture a more perilous activity. 
Indeed, PRP is implemented primarily in Natural Regions 4 and 5. Table 3 confirms 
that there are many more people living in poverty in the drier agro-ecological regions 
compared to the better rainfall regions. It suggests that with limited investment in 
water infrastructure agriculture does not generate enough income for a household to 
live on.  
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Table 4 Poverty by Natural Region in Rural Areas 
Natural Region 
Prevalence (%) of 
Poverty Extreme Poverty 
I 62.4 36.2 
II 71.6 41.2 
III 77.3 51.4 
IV 81.6 57.2 
V 79.5 55.7 
Source: (Central Statistical Office 1998) 
Much of the present spatiality of poverty can be explained by past policies of land 
alienation. Part of the argument for land reform was to correct this imbalance in 
access to productive land and, decongest the communal areas that had room for 
only 325 000 farm units but by 1980 already carried 675 00020. The extent to which 
land reform has decongested the communal areas is not known but evidence from 
the 23 PRP districts where LIME data are available still suggests that the ability to 
use land it is still a major determinant of exit from poverty. In almost all the rural 
districts, households in the lowest wealth groups had access to similar amount of 
land to other wealth groups. It is the proportion cultivated that is very different for 
different wealth groups. The very poor households will cultivate a much smaller 
proportion compared to other wealth groups. The LIME data suggest that land 
utilization is constrained by lack of capabilities specifically draft power, seed, and 
labour.  
Some (see for example Arrighi 1970) argue that communal areas were designed as 
labour reservoirs for the mines, large scale farms, and the urban industries and were 
never meant to be viable entities. It could be argued that the communal areas have 
by default continued to play this role even after independence. Indeed the PRP 
reports consistently show on one hand that labour migration affects rural production 
especially in labour constrained poor households. On the other hand evidence from 
PRP suggests that labour migration is a well established livelihoods strategy 
benefiting the better off households especially those in livelihood zones like South 
Western (Matopo), Western Kalahari Sandveld (Bulilima), Mwenezi-Chivi-Central 
and South Midlands (Zvishavane) and Beitbridge and, South Western Lowveld 
Communal (Matobo) (Zvarevashe 2010 Mutiro 2010).  
6 Which Social Groups are Poor? 
We saw earlier how for a smallholder farmer, being located in a marginal agro-
ecological zone often implies a life of poverty if they lack an ability to make 
investments in land. Apart from this spatiality determined poverty, there are some 
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socio-culturally determined factors that can trap a household into poverty. Evidence 
from PRP (see for example Hobane, Kageler and Zimbizi: 2006) shows that there 
are age, health status, marital status and family size defined social groups among 
the poor households. Table 5 is a summary of these. 
 
Table 5 Social Groups Living in Poverty 
Social Determinant Who is Poor 
Health Chronically ill 
Disabled 
Age Child headed 
Grandparent headed  
Gender Female headed 
Marital Status Single, Divorced, Widowed, Polygamous 
Family size Those with orphans 
High dependency ratio (5 or more 
dependents) 
 
It is clear from Table 5 that there is a core group of households predisposed to 
poverty simply because their social make up makes it harder to either make a living 
or attract adequate public policy attention and support. PRP has had a specific focus 
on these households and indeed in all programme districts the social protection 
packages have had a deliberate focus on these. 
The health status of a household has a bearing on its ability to make a living. Indeed 
evidence from PRP wealth ranking suggests in 18 of the 23 districts reviewed the 
households found in the very poor category have a chronically ill member of the 
household and will often have an orphan. In fact, many of the households that have 
remained within their wealth group even after PRP derive from this household type21. 
The HIV/AIDS epidemic has left a legacy of child and grandparent headed 
households. GoZ (2011:5) estimates that there are at least 989 009 orphans in 
Zimbabwe. Although many of these live off surviving relatives about a tenth (100 
000)22 live on their own often headed by a sibling below the age of 18years. Such 
households are more likely to be poor compared to a household headed by a male of 
working age. Evidence from ZIMVAC 2011 shows child headed households incomes 
are half the average earnings of an adult male headed household. Such households 
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are likely to be labour constrained and hence struggle to be productive. They are 
also socially excluded and do not benefit directly from participation in some livelihood 
activities23. 
Insights from both ICES and PASS show that more female headed households live 
in poverty compared to the male-headed households. In fact, from ZIMVAC 2011 
there is evidence that a female-headed household has an income that is only 50 per 
cent of what a male headed household has access to. In a patriarchy that Zimbabwe 
is, this is not surprising.  Although generally equal at law, some customary practices 
still mean that women can only access productive resources through the patriarchy 
(Horrell and Krishnan 2006). This tends to affect their ability to make a living once 
the male household head dies. Makura (2010) and Moyo and Kawewe (2009) have 
shown how many of the widows of HIV/AIDS victims often live a life of poverty when 
the male heir decides to limit their access to productive resources. ZIMVAC (2011) 
shows that nearly 70 per cent of all female-headed household are always food 
insecure and need food aid in any given year. Female managed households tend to 
fare better although delayed production related decision-making is seen as a major 
constraint on productivity. This is particularly so if the husband works outside 
Zimbabwe and continues to make decisions about how productive assets are utilised 
on a periodic basis. In a rain fed agricultural environment where a delay in decision 
making at the start of the season by just a few days can reduce yields by up to 30 
per cent, it is clear that female managed households can easily fall into poverty.  
Another social group likely to be found among those living in poverty includes the 
labour constrained households. From the PRP LIME data these include households 
facing chronic illnesses, grand-parent headed, child headed and households with 
disability. It is estimated that about two per cent of the population (about 254 000 
people) in Zimbabwe live with a form of disability that potentially affects their ability to 
make a living (Land and Charowa 2007: 15). About a fifth of these (57 000) are 
children.  There is evidence that households with a disability have low mean incomes 
and are more likely to be poor than those without disability (ibid). 
Family size is another social parameter that features prominently in the PRP data. 
These data suggest that it is not just the number of individuals in a household that 
matters but the dependency ratio. For example in Mutare both the very poor and 
better off households have seven household members and yet they have very 
different outcomes because of the dependency ratio and of course other personal 
circumstances (Makoni et al 2010). Many of the households in the very poor 
category in rural areas have high dependency ratios. Where the dependency ratio is 
low, larger households fare better as they are able to deploy them in livelihood 
pursuits (LIME Baseline Report 14: 2011) 
                                                          
23




7 How has Poverty Changed Over Time 
Capturing poverty trends or change over time requires panel data sets designed with 
this in mind. Indeed PRP LIME uses a quasi-experimental design that will allow an 
assessment of how poverty has changed over time when it is evaluated. Literature 
reviewed based on data from the 1990/1 and 1995-6 ICES suggests that those living 
in income poverty rose from 52.8 per cent in 1990-91 to 75.6 per cent in 1995-9624. 
In fact real household consumption declined by 24 per cent between the two surveys 
(Elwang, 2002: 11). Although not directly comparable, a new set of surveys, the 
Poverty Assessment Study Surveys (PASS) also confirmed that income poverty 
continued to rise from 1995 to 2003-04 suggesting that the proportion of households 
living under the poverty line increased from 42 per cent in 1995 to 63 per cent in 
2003-04 (MPSLSW 2006).  
Apart from the periodic ZIMVAC and MIMS there is no poverty survey data for the 
period 2004 till 2011 although there is a general consensus in the literature reviewed 
suggesting that poverty levels peaked in the late 2000s. If we use the data on food 
insecure households we can make a general conclusion that since 2003 poverty 
levels rose dramatically, peaked in 2008 and have begun to tail off since the 
formation of the inclusive government in 2009. Similarly a consideration of UNDP 
development rankings sheds light on decline in welfare conditions in Zimbabwe. The 
fact that Zimbabwe‟s 2011 HDI value has been below the regional (sub-Saharan 
Africa) average since 2000 suggests (in comparative terms) a lack of progress in 
improving welfare conditions in Zimbabwe over time. In the next section we look at 
the drivers of poverty in Zimbabwe.  
8 Drivers of Poverty in Zimbabwe 
The CPRC (2010) identify five traps that drive and keep households in poverty. 
These are: livelihood insecurity; limited citizenship, spatial disadvantage, social 
discrimination and poor work opportunities. Many of these drivers are common in 
Zimbabwe and indeed PRP analysis25 shows that in rural districts the main drivers of 
poverty are „drought, lack of agricultural inputs as well as unaffordability (where 
available) and “laziness” on the part of particular households. Similarly in the former 
large scale commercial farming area (Makonde, Mazoe) the communities ascribed 
their poverty to government macro policies that cost them jobs. They also perceive 
themselves as discriminated against as they did not gain access to land and other 
public entitlements. Urban dwellers had a slightly different take instead ascribing 
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their poverty to „hyper inflation and unemployment which have caused the cost of 
living to be unaffordable‟26  In addition they also attest to the effects of government 
policy especially the infamous Operation Murambatsvina which „closed or limited 
main means of livelihoods for most poor and average families in the suburb‟. Further 
analysis of PRP LIME data returns three main clusters of districts reflected in table 6.  
Table 6 Clustering of Districts according to Drivers of Poverty 
Cluster PRP 
District 
Main Drivers of Poverty 














 Marginality presents production challenges for resource 
constrained farmers 
 Climatic challenges 
 Labour constraints due to migration of able bodied 
 Remoteness- being away from line of rail limits integration to 
markets and increases production costs; also poor market and 
technology information 
 Constrained access to land and, capacity  to use land 
 Limited and poor quality off farm employment 
 Moral hazard 
 







 Mainly urban line of rail districts fully integrated into national 
economic infrastructure hard hit by economic collapse 
 Poor quality employment, casualisation of labour 
 Limited trading opportunities –lack of public policy support for 
small and micro enterprises 
 Barriers to entry into employment and retail markets 
 Adverse effects of public policy 
Cluster 3 Mazoe 
Makonde 
 Former farm workers with constrained access to productive 
assets 
 Constrained ability to use land  
 Poor quality employment, seasonal, poor pay, labour tenancy 
 Adverse effects of public policy 
 
Cluster 1 districts are the predominantly rural, mainly communal areas that suffer 
from what the CPRC (2010) call a spatial disadvantage. They are located in marginal 
environments and endure weather and climate induced hardships that constrain 
livelihood pursuits. The districts are mainly located off the main „line of rail‟ 
(Bulawayo-Harare-Mutare trunk route) and are therefore away from the core centres 
of the formal economy. A combination of marginality and remoteness presents this 
spatial disadvantage that limits the viability of and livelihood opportunities.  
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Cluster 2 districts are mainly urban and located within the main „line of rail‟ trunk 
route. The main driver of poverty in this cluster is the collapse of the formal economy 
during the crisis. This has affected the quality and quality of jobs available a factor 
compounded by what CPRC (2010) has termed limited citizenship.  A lack of voice 
and effective representation often sees policies that work against them and 
compromises their ability to make a living27.  
Cluster 3 districts are located in areas of comparatively better agro-ecological 
potential (Makonde and Mazoe are part of the bread basket districts in Zimbabwe). 
Poverty in these locations is driven by insecurity, poor work opportunities, social 
discrimination and limited citizenship28. These PRP locations occupied mostly by 
displaced former farm workers record some of the highest levels of poverty of any of 
the PRP sites. They have constrained access to land and where they have land 
often lack the ability and capacity to use the land to make a living. They have access 
to limited (often casual and seasonal) employment that pays little.29Many are in 
labour tenancy arrangements that are as insecure as they are exploitative. 
Within these specific drivers of poverty in the districts we can distil two types of 
drivers that cut across the clusters. Co-variant drivers are structural in nature, are 
generalised and affect all households. Their widespread nature means they often 
require long term national level policy programming responses at scale. Covariant 
drivers are often seen as being more lethal because their generalised nature often 
implies that individuals and communities cannot help each other in meaningful ways 
to climb out of poverty.  On the other hand idiosyncratic drivers target specific 
individuals, households, social groups, communities or defined spatialities.  They 
hurt individual entities but there is scope for localised interventions through project or 
sector specific programme responses.  In the next section we explore these in some 
detail referring to both the general Zimbabwe situation and to PRP. 
 
9 Covariant Drivers of Poverty in Zimbabwe 
The Economic Drivers of Poverty: Low Productivity and Anaemic Growth 
Much of the poverty experienced by Zimbabweans today can be explained by the 
cumulative effects of poor economic growth since the late 1990s. For over ten years 
Zimbabwe went through a period of sustained economic decline that saw gross 
domestic product per capita which had peaked at US$574 in 1998 decline by nearly 
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50 per cent to US$284 by 2008. Among other factors, this decline in GDP per capita 
triggered a rise in income poverty that also led to significant asset attrition. Hyper-
inflation that reached 231 million per cent in July 200830 is an indicator of the 
unstable economy which was also characterised by poor performance in 
manufacturing, agriculture and mining whose growth has historically been associated 
with poverty decline. When Zimbabwe‟s average GDP growth rates per decade are 
computed we find a story of three decades of a progressive slide into poverty. The 
first decade of independence can be described as one of growth while the second 
was one of stagnation followed by decline in the post-2000 period. Figure 1 
illustrates growth trends in GDP, manufacturing, and agriculture between 1980 and 
2005. It shows positive but fluctuating growth for nearly two decades till the late 
1990s when the economy went into an extended recession. 










Source: Chimhowu et al 2011 
 
Loss of jobs during the economic decline reduced household earnings a factor that 
saw many households descend into poverty. Chimhowu et al (2011) argue that 
although the economic decline accelerated during the 2000s the economy shed jobs 
during the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) and was already in 
decline by the time the full blown crisis emerged in 2000.  Figure 2 illustrates this and 
shows that from 1997 there was no growth in formal sector employment largely due 
to poor performance from the productive sectors of the economy. It is beyond the 
scope of this paper to look at the reason for the poor performance in the productive 
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sectors but elsewhere this has been put down to the failure of ESAP to meet its 
targets due to a variety of reasons that included a major drought and declining 
commodity prices(see Elwang et al 2002). 
Figure 2: Employment Growth in Post Independence Zimbabwe 
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Source: Chimhowu et al 2011 
By the time the crisis abated in 2009 the economy had shed nearly half the formal 
sector jobs and created a new generation of poor households. From a peak of 1 329 
000 formal sector workers only 766 39131 jobs remained at the end of 2010. Non-
agricultural employment declined from 896 400 in 1998 to 763 164 in 2010 so in the 
main, it was the loss of about 150 000 agriculture related rural employment that has 
reduced rural incomes for a specific sub group of farm workers. The demise of large 
scale commercial farming also significantly reduced the income and consumption 
smoothing possibilities for rural households in communal areas adjacent to 
commercial farms (Chimhowu and Woodhouse 2008). Many sank deeper into 
poverty with loss of formal sector employment and reliance on household based 
employment. Much of the rural and urban poverty today can be explained by this 
decline in quality employment.  
 
Jobless Growth: Sector Contributions and Low Poverty Reduction Elasticity  
Although the socio-economic crisis ended and the economy has stabilised and 
begun to grow, what then explains the fact that the poverty figures have remained 
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high three years on? Reasons for this are varied but the literature points to one main 
structural factor. A look at the sectoral contribution to growth shows that much of the 
economic growth is led by sectors with low poverty reduction elasticity. Mining which 
has rebounded by nearly 4432 per cent has been credited with boosting the overall 
growth rate and yet a look at Table 7 shows a decline in formal sector jobs being 
created.  
Table 7 Formal Sector Employment in Zimbabwe 1995; 2009 and 2010 
Employment Sector 1995 2009 2010 
Number % Number % Number % 
Agriculture 334 000 26.9 5 20233 1 3 227 0 
Mining 59 000 4.8 49 891 5 34 235 4 
Manufacturing 185 900 15 171 007 19 128 972 18 
Electricity and Water 9 500 0.8 16 763 2 14 073 2 
Construction 71 800 5.8 39 136 4 20 749 3 
Distribution, Restaurants and Hotels 100 000 8.1 103 812 11 71 595 9 
Transport and Communication 50 900 4.1 38 593 4 20 050 3 
Finance and Insurance 21 000 1.7 84 289 9 65 042 8 
Public Administration 77 000 6.2 91 277 10 93 960 12 
Education 115 600 9.3 122 424 13 119 012 16 
Health 26 000 2.1 50 685 5 45 574 6 
Private Domestic 102 100 8.2 102 156 11 102 156 13 
Other Services 86 100 6.9 59 506 6 47 746 6 
Total 1 239 600 100 934 738 100 766 391 100 
Source: 1999 data from CSO (1998:54); 2009 and 2010 data supplied from Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency 
(unpublished 2011) 
 
Mining led growth by its very nature does not generate the type of employment that 
is often seen as poverty reducing (Loayza and Raddatz 2009; Khan 1999). Lack of 
growth or high enough growth in those sectors with higher poverty reduction 
elasticity like agriculture and manufacturing has meant that employment growth has 
remained weak.   
Decline in Agricultural Production and Productivity Growth 
Earlier it was argued that since a majority of the people living in poverty are based in 
the rural areas and make a living off the land, poverty will only abate when their 
incomes begin to rise either through increases in agricultural productivity or through 
quality rural employment opportunities. What happens to their incomes will likely 
determine outcomes of current poverty reduction efforts. For the moment, their 
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livelihoods are tied to agriculture significantly and it is clear that making this work will 
be the main pathway out of poverty for them and for the urban poor as well given 
that manufacturing growth has always depended on agriculture doing well. We saw 
from figures 1 and 2 how agriculture productivity growth affects overall economic 
growth. When agriculture does well, the economy has grown and employment 
growth has been observed as manufacturing also tends to do well (up to 60 per cent 
of raw materials for manufacturing industry in Zimbabwe are derived from 
agriculture). We also know that historically when rural incomes rise, effective 
domestic demand for manufactured goods and services also rises, which can 
provide a market for increased output. Although agriculture in Zimbabwe has often 
been afflicted by a drought once every four to five years, during good rainfall 
seasons poverty levels decline and droughts always drag some vulnerable 
households deeper into poverty. While much of the urban poverty and some of the 
rural poverty can be explained by loss of income earning abilities due to loss of, and 
lack of quality employment, much of the rural poverty can be explained by the 
collapse of agricultural production during the crises and persistently low productivity 
over time. 
If we take a closer look at the output growth the official data show moderate growth 
in the value of agricultural output produced in both commercial (including Small 
Scale Commercial Farming) and communal (including resettlement) areas over the 
1982-97 period in contrast to the 2 years before that period. From 1999 production 
slumped to below levels of the mid 1980s, with major fluctuations in production 
according to weather conditions. Official figures, though, show that between 1982-4 
and 1996 the real value of production in communal areas grew by 40 per cent, whilst 
between 1983-4 and 1996 the real value of production in commercial areas grew by 
35per cent. During the crisis period there was a distinct reversal of this trend and real 
value of production fell by 33 per cent (CSO, 2006). It is clear that the crisis caused a 
severe decline in Zimbabwean agriculture and the rural economy in general in the 
process driving many into poverty. The crisis affected agriculture in very specific 
ways that had a bearing on people‟s ability to make a living off the land. We highlight 
the key ones below. 
 
 Collapse in Agricultural Commodity Marketing and Pricing.  
The hyper-inflation environment (231 million per cent) gravely affected returns on 
agriculture. This meant that most people that used to produce for the formal 
market were reluctant to do so as the delays in processing payments meant that 
by the time they were paid the money was worth nothing. Households that used 
to produce for the markets stopped and produced mostly food crops for 
sustenance. 
 Asset attrition.  
The protracted decline in the economy since 2000 also resulted in asset attrition 
as households sold off assets as a consumption smoothing strategy. This often 
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meant selling off liquid assets also necessary for agricultural production. A 
decline in cattle numbers was particularly obvious in some areas although in 
other areas the crisis saw an increase (Scoones 2011).  A lack of cattle 
undermines availability of draught power and also compromises the income and 
consumption smoothing strategies of rural households. 
 Labour Shortage 
There is a basic assumption of labour abundance in rural Zimbabwe owing to 
displacement of former commercial farm workers. Available evidence from the 
PRP LIME suggests that apart from migration of the able bodied, an inability to 
hire labour by the smallholder farmers means that labour shortage is a limiting 
factor on productivity. Most able bodied young adults that provided family labour 
either left rural Zimbabwe for other countries in the region or have opted for non-
farm rural activities like artisanal mining. This has created labour constraints on 
production on the family farm. Further, skill has become a limiting factor. As 
experienced and trained smallholder farmers have been dying off due to old age 
and HIV/AIDS the agricultural skills base has been undermined significantly. 
 Declining soil fertility.  
Initial productivity increases in communal lands after the war could be accounted 
for by the virgin land effect. Once soil fertility declined due to use over time the 
high external inputs model of production (hybrid seeds and fertiliser) that was 
introduced became too expensive to maintain especially given declining 
profitability due to poor pricing structure and lack of state support(due to ESAP). 
Once input supply and output marketing chains collapsed due to the crisis, 
participation in the formal commodity markets became perilous and indeed there 
are cases of rural producers that sank deeper into poverty because they were 
never paid for the output they delivered through the official marketing channels 
especially for the controlled commodities like maize. 
 Dying out of private finance for agriculture.  
Once the state stopped supporting the smallholder farmers with subsidised 
inputs, many farmers became indebted and failed to secure private finance 
needed for inputs. It is quite clear that during the years following the 1992 
drought when some free inputs were made available there was a productivity 
spike especially in food crops like maize. In the post-2000 period the demise of 
commercial farming that used to provide bridging income for inputs among 
resettled farmers has worsened the situation. Before the demise of large scale 
commercial farming some smallholder farmers could seek temporary employment 
on farms and used this to purchase inputs. Others relied on urban formal 
employment to generate the inputs. Once the large scale farms were taken over 
during the post-2000 invasions and the formal sector jobs began to decline due to 
the deteriorating economy this income smoothing strategy was no longer 
available.  
 Insecure Tenure.  
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Even if private financing was still available, one of the key limiting factors is the 
terms under which land is accessed. It is clear that apart from the state and 
agricultural commodity brokers, financial institutions did and still will not extend 
credit facilities to the resettled and communal farmers due to lack of tenure 
security. Financial institutions reduced the amount of loan finance available to 
support agriculture after the Fast Track Land Reform.  
 
A combination of the factors above no doubt contributed to the productivity decline in 
agriculture that affected the ability of many to make a living off the land. There is no 
doubt that poverty was already increasing by the time of the farm invasions in 2000 
but it is also clear that poverty rates continued to grow during the crisis and by all 
measures a majority of Zimbabweans were desperately poor by the time the crisis 
abated in 2009. Many that grew enough to feed themselves became food insecure 
while those that always produced a surplus were affected by the market collapse. 
Since 2008/9 season when the crisis abated agriculture has begun to rebound but 
not recovered. Table 8 below shows the production trends of major food and cash 
crops over the last three growing seasons. 
Table 8 Area planted and production of major crops 2008/2009 to 
2010/2011 season 
Crop 2008/2009 Season 2009/2010 Season 2010/2011 Season 
 Area(ha) Production(Mt) Area(ha) Production(Mt) Area(ha) Production(Mt) 
Maize 1 500 000 1 242 586 1 803 520 1 327 572 2 096 035 1 451 629 
Sorghum 389 333 181 448 386 585 131 644 304 693 94 789 
Pearl Millet 153 545 50 938 189 644 49 840 164 895 44 666 
F Millet 101 189 37 162 54 372  12 403 63 287 16 627 
Tobacco 47 691 58 570 67 000 123 407 79 759 132 400 
Cotton 337 671 207 000 338 270 270 000 379 689 249 904 
Soya beans 85 227 115 817 48 010 70 256 60 124 84 173 
Sugarbeans 52 265 37 321 30 715 17 200 26 778 13 121 
Groundnuts 354 636 216 619 424 532 186 214 426 806 230 475 
Sugarcane 39 000 3 100 000 36 174 2 338 300 38 000 2 565 000 
Tea - - 3 500 10 500 3 500 10 500 
Coffee - - 900 2 700 900 2 700 
Source: ZIMSTAT 2011 
Productivity levels are still low and the peak yields of the 1980s are yet to be 
matched. Contemporary maize yields of 0.7t/ha are still well below the 1-1.4t/ha 
reached during the mid 1990s (GoZ 2011: 104) and famers still cannot produce 
enough grain to feed the nation.  In the next section we look at how the breakdown in 






Declining State Capacity and Breakdown in Claims and Entitlement 
One of the key roles of the state in a democracy is to ensure adequate provisioning 
of essential goods and services either directly through its programmes or by 
ensuring that conditions allow for markets or other non-state actors to fill any gaps in 
provisioning.  When the citizens feel unable to make public service claims against 
their government there is a breakdown in trust that often leads individuals to turn to 
alternative providers or do without. The post-colonial Zimbabwe state was always 
populist. It sought to ensure universal access to health and education. Over nearly 
two decades it had built what by regional standards was seen as a very able and 
competent bureaucracy that ensured the core functions of and public service claims 
by citizens against the state were met (Agere 1998).  Markets for some essential 
public goods were also allowed to provide for particular groups especially the middle 
classes while other non-sate actors were given space within government 
programmes to assist. A majority of Zimbabweans still relied on state provisioning of 
these core services.  
However when the budget deficit began to grow and the socio-economic crises 
deepened in the 2000s the capacity of the state to deliver public goods and services 
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to its citizens was very severely curtailed at a time when citizen‟s dependence on 
state provisioning of these core public services was growing. For a start a severe 
brain drain owing to growing political uncertainty and poor salaries34 affected the 
capacity of the state to deliver its programmes while crippling inflation simply made 
day to day programming unfeasible. Similarly, education and health expenditure 
began to decline. In fact education per capita grants shrunk to less than one US cent 
per child in 2008 compared to US$6.26 in 1990/91. This explains why schools were 
unable to purchase textbooks and other teaching/learning materials. The health 
budget in real terms also began to shrink and by 2007 the per capita allocation of 
health in the budget had declined to less than US$0.19 per year.  
It therefore was no surprise that after initial improvements during the 1980‟s many of 
the health and education indicators began to worsen. For example crude death rate 
dropped from 10.8 in 1982 to 6.1 in 1987 then rose to 9.49 in 1992 before nearly 
doubling to 17.2/1000 population by 2007. Similarly infant mortality that had declined 
to 53 per 1000 live birth had risen to 68 per 1000 by 2008. Similarly, in education, 
the very impressive enrolment rates began to falter and by 2011, evidence suggests 
that up to 18 per cent of 5-17 year olds who should be in school are not in school35.  
The major reason cited by nearly 52 per cent of households is the issue of user fees 
and other informal rents citizens are having to pay to access their entitlements36. 
More directly, this breakdown in entitlement to essential public goods and services 
can drive households into poverty. Many of the people that need the state to work 
and provide the goods and services are the vulnerable. Without access to health and 
education essential to fully participate in social, political and economic development 
many of these children not in education, employment or training (NEETS) will find it 
difficult to make a living. They will have few opportunities to earn an income in a 
quality job. In a way we could say that the decline in state‟s capacity to provide for 
basic social services and infrastructure affects quality human capital formation and 
overall productivity and in the long term affects growth prospects. In the next section 
we consider some idiosyncratic drivers of poverty in Zimbabwe. 
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 By the time the inclusive government was formed in 2009 civil servants staff salaries were a paltry 12.3 per 
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 Many of the fees and rents are discretionary and therefore remain hidden from the official costs of accessing 
public goods and services.  
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10 Idiosyncratic Drivers of Poverty 
Ability to use land  
Many of the idiosyncratic drivers emerge from looking at the profiles of the poor and 
reviewing their life stories in the PRP-LIME data. For many rural households the lack 
of ability and capacity to use land is a major driver. With the land redistribution 
process all but done, at least for now, it is clear that households that fail to produce 
more on the land they currently have will likely fail to raise their incomes through 
agriculture and will have to diversify out of agriculture. In fact there is already 
evidence of this happening. ZIMVAC (2011) shows 41 per cent of households 
reported casual labour as the main source of income followed by remittances (28 per 
cent) and vegetable sales (23 per cent). Crop sales feature a distant fifth after 
livestock sales with just 11 per cent of the households indicating this as a main 
source of income. What the PRP-LIME data however show clearly is that when the 
poor and very poor households with access to land are helped to use more of their 
land they can increase production and become food secure while in some cases 
they can even produce a surplus for the market37. When a household‟s ability to use 
the land is enhanced through programming interventions such households can 
become food secure and begin to climb their way out of poverty38 
Natural and Policy Shocks and Stresses 
For some households, the occurrence of shock and stress to their lives or livelihoods 
can be the core driver into poverty. Adverse life cycle events like death of a 
breadwinner, divorce, and or prolonged illness are known to be triggers of a descent 
into poverty. Apart from reducing productivity due to the time lost tending to these 
issues some life cycle events can lead to asset attrition through involuntary or 
distress sales. Many of the HIV/AIDS deaths for example are often seen as poverty 
inducing because of the prolonged nature of the illness and the costs incurred up to 
the time of death. This often means there is no impartible inheritance for the 
surviving family members who often have to rebuild their assets. In fact from PRP we 
learn that many of the households in the „very poor‟ category have landed there 
through personal misfortunes like chronic illness, bereavement or divorce39.  
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 Mushipe et al (2011) show for example how households classified as poor in Gokwe increased area 
under cultivation by more than 60 per cent once programming effort increased their ability to use the 
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Natural weather cycles in Zimbabwe can also be poverty inducing. In general, a 
drought is expected once every four to five years. Once every ten years a major 
drought occurs. While households can cope with low or late rains, available evidence 
suggests that it is the major droughts that families often fail to recover from. Kinsey 
(2010)‟s longitudinal study has shown how some households that became poor 
during the 1992/2 drought have never fully recovered from the effects of this drought.  
In some cases state policies can drive individuals or groups of people deeper into 
poverty. From PRP reports we learn that many of the urban poor today can 
specifically trace their impoverishment to the retrenchments that followed the 
Economic Structural Adjustment Programme in the early 1990s. Similarly, a majority 
of the very poor and poor in urban and peri-urban locations in Zimbabwe will point to 
the 2005 state sponsored programme „Operation Murambatsvina‟ as a trigger of their 
decent into poverty. Some who lost their homes and livelihoods have never 
recovered from the effects in spite of remedial programmes by both state and non-
state actors. 
It is clear from this discussion so far that the covariant and idiosyncratic drivers 
combine to produce the landscape of poverty that was discussed in section 3. Three 
key points are worth highlighting based on this discussion so far. Firstly, is the fact 
that although the two co-produce each other, by far the greatest drivers of poverty 
are those that affect economic growth on a much wider scale. That means getting 
the politics right is as important as getting the economics of growth right. Secondly, 
while growth is important, it should be borne in mind that it is not any growth that will 
do for poverty reduction. It is growth that is driven by sectors with a high poverty 
reduction elasticity that will have the most impact in reducing poverty. For rural areas 
evidence from PRP shows that a focus on building the capacity to produce food 
often allows households to begin to climb out of poverty.  Thirdly, for the urban we 
more broadly see employment growth as the most direct way to reduce poverty. In 
the next section we look at the experiences of PRP and others to draw out some 
lessons on what works for poverty reduction and wealth creation. The focus here is 
on both the substance of interventions and the programming operations. 
 
11 Emerging Lessons after 8 years of PRP 
The Protracted Relief Programme (PRP) was launched in Zimbabwe by the UK 
Department for International Development (DFID) in 2004. This first phase lasted 
until 2008, when the second phase (2008-12) was commissioned. The second phase 
has evolved to be a multi-donor funded programme, financed by Australian Aid 
(AusAID), Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), the European Union 
(EU), the Embassy of the Kingdom of Netherlands (EKN), the Norwegian Agency for 
Development (NORAD), UK Department for International Development (DFID) and 
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the World Bank. Funding for the current phase amounts to over USD 130 million. It 
has reached over two million vulnerable people throughout Zimbabwe. In its last 12 
months the programme is being implemented by 23 international and local national 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) plus six Innovation Fund partners. GRM 
International, a consultant company, is responsible for management and 
coordination.    
The PRP aimed to reduce extreme poverty in Zimbabwe and through various 
programming interventions sought to prevent suffering and at the same time build 
the capacity of beneficiary households to graduate out of poverty. This was done 
through a mixture of emergency, recovery and development interventions. The 
balance, in terms of resource allocation, between emergency, recovery and 
development, has been changing with the evolving context in Zimbabwe. In the 
current phase the interventions are now more developmental, building the 
sustainability and resilience of the livelihood systems of the very poor people in 
Zimbabwe. Phase I reached 1.5 million people. Phase II helped to increase coverage 
to at least 2 million in both urban and rural areas. So what lessons can we learn from 
the combined experiences of all the actors? Based on an analysis of the very 
detailed report we distil six key areas of learning for the future. We discuss these 
below and start with lessons learnt from rural programming. 
Productivity Growth and Conservation Agriculture 
The PRP has demonstrated very clearly that productivity growth is key to raising 
rural incomes and providing pathways out of poverty. The biggest problem for 
smallholder agriculture has been low productivity. What the PRP has demonstrated 
is that by providing sustained input support households gain an ability to use their 
land to better themselves. In particular it is the introduction of a new generation of 
production technologies that has been the greatest success especially for grain 
production. Conservation agriculture has managed to strike a very delicate balance 
between high external input agriculture (that does not work in an environment where 
input markets are constrained) and low external input agriculture (that is not realistic 
in dry land farming). By innovating and experimenting with a „third way‟ PRP may 
have emerged with a way forward for African agriculture. The PRP LIME data shows 
the rapid productivity gains especially among the very poor and poor households 
(Mutiro et al Keogh 2011).40 Many of the households that had never produced a 
surplus for nearly a decade have managed to and are looking to participate in 
markets.  
There are some emerging drawbacks affecting labour constrained households but 
there is evidence that PRP has allowed CA to evolve into the next generation that 
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recognise this by supporting introduction of mechanised CA 41.  It is still early days 
for this innovation but initial results suggest a breakthrough and a definite need for 
further research and propagation beyond the PRP activity. Further, while there is no 
doubt that conservation agriculture has enhanced productivity growth, this very 
success could be what undermines it if this productivity growth is undermined by lack 
of access to markets especially for those already producing surplus. There is 
evidence in some areas that selling locally is no longer an option as most 
households are increasingly becoming food secure.  It is clear that this is an area 
where coordinating with private sector players could begin to help connect the 
farmers to markets. 
 
 
Institution Building and Policy Making from Below 
Until the crisis, Zimbabwe had a very efficient and effective bureaucracy that liked to 
build institutions and policy from above (Agere 1998). Such an approach only works 
in situations where development is being done in a „normal‟ setting (there is no 
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governance crisis, markets work and the economy is sound). A question that 
emerges however is what happens when the „centre‟ is weakened and suspends 
normal programming and markets cannot provide the public goods and services? 
What the PRP has shown is the importance of building local level agency and 
capacity to co-ordinate and „do development‟ with the co-operation rather than 
direction of the state. Doing so restores entitlements and claim making from below 
and enhances demand side accountability. It is a way to reach people when state 
institutions at the centre do not work well or are paralysed by lack of resources. That 
way development does not stop but continues through local agency. Of course the 
assumption here is that there is sufficient space for local actors to innovate and 
implement things without being hindered. This works well in situations of state failure 
and perhaps this is an important lesson governments need to know. From PRP 
experiences, it was clear that in the limited access of health, education and 
extension services it was the local „first responders‟ that filled this vacuum. Volunteer 
–led Farmer Field Schools filled a void left by under resourced extension services 
while „para vets‟ began to provide services to livestock farmers. Similarly many of the 
Community Home Based Care/WASH groups have morphed into community based 
savings groups (Mukando). Many of the institutions formed are assuming a life of 
their own without PRP42. A key challenge however for policy making from below is 
the lack of coherence across sectors and across the geographical space. In the 
absence of a plan (as a point of reference for the disparate group) policy making 
from below can create a lack of spatial coherence that can easily undermine the 
ability of poor people to make a living. Perhaps the question this raises is whether 
this model only works when the centre cannot hold things together? 
Embracing the Mosaic of Livelihoods 
Zimbabwe is divided into 23 relatively homogeneous zones, developed by the 
Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee (ZIMVAC) defined according to a 
livelihoods framework. Livelihood zone profiles have also been developed which 
describe the major characteristics of each zone, including a brief differentiation of the 
food security status of different wealth groups. The aim of the profiles is to present 
sufficient information to allow a rounded and balanced view of livelihoods nationally. 
PRP is informed by the profiles and follows the Livelihood Zones in its programming. 
The Livelihood Zones assist the PRP in selecting the most vulnerable communities 
and targeting the most needy. 
Evidence from the PRP LIME data suggests that it embraced difference and did not 
seek to prescribe standard livelihoods models. By embracing difference within a 
uniform framework of understanding it has allowed the development of a mosaic of 
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livelihood portfolios better suited to the different settings in which it operated.  Many 
of the different settings have developed different combinations of livelihood activities 
that spread the risk of impoverishment. In particular it is the introduction of non-farm 
agriculture, such as income generating related activities that has provided some 
scope for income smoothing among the beneficiaries. 
Asset Building Matters when Incomes are Slow to Recover 
For many rural communities poverty is defined through access to and ownership of 
productive assets. This has been one of the key areas of learning from PRP and 
beyond.  Building an asset dimension to PRP programming has allowed households 
to work on raising their incomes but also begin the process of wealth creation. Asset 
building is crucial for taking the current generation out of poverty but also in stopping 
the intergenerational transfer of poverty (impartible inheritance). There is evidence 
from PRP that the transfer of wealth creating assets gives beneficiaries the 
confidence and security to begin investing and experiment with other livelihood 
options. What is however also clearly evident especially in the case of small 
ruminants transfers is that this allows individuals to begin to accumulate cattle over 
time. The LIME data suggest the use of small ruminants for income rather than 
consumption smoothing. They are used as ladders of wealth accumulation by 
households and there is clear evidence that some households helped onto this 
„productive assets‟ ladder by PRP are moving onto larger stock and more productive 
assets43.  
Similarly, one of the most popular PRP initiatives has been „Mukando‟ (community 
savings and lending scheme). In an environment like contemporary Zimbabwe where 
financial capital markets are constrained and underdeveloped, „mukando‟ or „kufusha 
mari‟ has emerged to fill this gap. In the process it has provided PRP an exit strategy 
while quite evidently improving women‟s self worth both within the community and in 
the household. However the question that still needs to be asked is:  does Mukando 
as currently conceptualised have the capacity to create local social differentiation by 
excluding the chronically poor? Further, will this create a generation of beneficiaries 
caught in a debt trap? Since Mukando is still very much locally driven and not run by 
an external agency, the possibility of this happening seems quite low but there is 
need to continue to monitor how they evolve. What is clear is that Mukando is 
providing the finance needed for local micro enterprise development. It is providing a 
service that no other public or private sector organisation is providing in the rural 
areas since the demise of SEDCO.  
Apart from these wealth creating assets, PRP has also had a focus on human capital 
formation. Many individuals have gained essential skills- through education and 
training driven by local needs not from colleges. Examples were given earlier on of 
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„volunteer farmer trainers‟, Paravets (charging a small fee), community home based 
care givers; and WASH groups. This is a form of human capital formation that not 
only promotes local agency but empowers individuals so that they feel able to deal 
with problems locally as they emerge. There is evidence of individuals gaining 
enough confidence to begin to participate in local governance issues through these 
asset building programmes.  
PRP and Social Protection for the Vulnerable 
Social protection has emerged as another area of policy making from below. For the 
poor and vulnerable groups (orphans, disabled, female headed households) their 
ability to participate in activities to build a livelihood may be limited by their 
circumstances. Different forms of social protection can make the difference between 
rebuilding their lives and falling into chronic poverty. PRP was very effective in 
„importing‟, adapting and experimenting with forms of social transfer, including food 
and cash that have been adopted and packaged into a coherent policy for 
implementation by the state, in the form of the Harmonised Cash Transfer Scheme. 
This is a policy innovation that plays both a redistributive and protective function. 
There is evidence from PRP LIME data that the cash transfers have contributed 
significantly to household incomes helping to stabilise consumption and meeting 
some of the cash needs. Some of the welfare outcomes are already clear. A look at 
the PRP LIME sites shows for example that cash transfers can be as much as 30 per 
cent of household incomes especially in rural areas. Similarly, school enrolment 





Through LIME, the PRP has learned that cash transfers, as currently designed, have 
less impact in the urban areas, where there is a cash economy and households have 
to pay for access to services such as electricity and water and in some cases rent. 
PRP LIME results show the need for a different design for urban areas – more 




Re-thinking and Reimagining Urban Programming 
There is evidence from PRP LIME data that urban programming was highly effective 
while it lasted. Its „palliative‟ dimension was effective in saving lives especially in post 
2004 when the economic collapse affected employment and food markets. Once a 
semblance of stability was restored through the formation of the inclusive 
government there is no evidence that urban programming in PRP remained as 
focused in ensuring a soft landing for the poor as they made the transition from 
„crisis‟ to „stability‟. If anything can be learnt perhaps it is that there is need to rethink 
new strategies for dealing with small but „very deep‟ pockets of urban poverty in an 
urban economy that is not generating quality formal employment. More specifically 
there is need for innovative thinking on the forms of social protection that can work in 
urban Zimbabwe where there are small concentrations of deep poverty located in an 
environment where fees and rents are often tenfold those of the rural environments 
Adaptive Management and Process Approach 
One of the lessons emerging from the PRP is the importance of adaptive 
management and process approach to programme planning. PRP was a multi-
faceted programme that was aiming to hit a moving target. It therefore required 
flexibility of programming and a rapid process of learning and changing course. It 
also had room for experimentation and for cross programme learning that allowed it 
to share knowledge and experience of what works in which settings. Having a robust 
monitoring and evaluation framework worked well as it allowed lessons learnt to be 
shared among partners. It also appears that donors gave PRP the „room for 
manoeuvre‟ that allowed innovative programming to thrive. It also allowed sufficient 
interface with state institutions to allow them to learn and adopt practices and 
programmes that the state felt would work. This provided good scope for an exit 
strategy for PRP. 
12 Conclusions and Recommendations 
Poverty in Zimbabwe is widespread and levels are deep, particularly in the rural 
areas. There are two types of drivers of poverty in Zimbabwe, namely covariant or 
structural drivers which affect all households, and idiosyncratic which target specific 
individuals, households, social groups or communities.  The widespread nature of 
co-variant drivers means that they often require long term national level policy 
programming responses at scale. Covariant drivers, such as economic crisis and 
jobless growth, breakdown in claims and entitlement, and inadequate markets are 
often seen as being more lethal because their generalised nature often implies that 
individuals and communities cannot help each other in meaningful ways to climb out 
of poverty.  On the other hand idiosyncratic drivers, such as access to assets, 
shocks and stresses such as illness and crop failures, hurt individual entities but 
there is scope for localised interventions through specific programme responses.   
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In an effort to reduce extreme poverty in Zimbabwe the PRP through various 
programming interventions sought to prevent suffering and at the same time build 
the capacity of beneficiary households to graduate out of poverty. This was done 
through a mixture of emergency, recovery and development interventions which 
reached about 2 million people in both rural and urban areas. The balance, in terms 
of resource allocation, between emergency, recovery and development, changed 
with the evolving context in Zimbabwe, with the current interventions being more 
developmental, building the sustainability and resilience of the livelihood systems of 
the very poor people in Zimbabwe.  
A number of lessons have been learnt from the PRP and other actors‟ experiences 
together with the various studies and surveys on poverty, to help inform a strategy 
for further poverty reduction and wealth creation. A number of factors are important 
that can work to reduce poverty, namely productivity growth and promotion of 
smallholder farming; institution building and policy making from below; social 
protection, which can play both a redistributive and protective function; encouraging 
diverse livelihoods; and asset building which is crucial for taking the current 
generation out of poverty. Furthermore, another key lesson emerging from the PRP 
is the importance of adaptive management and process approach to programme 
planning. PRP was a multi-faceted programme that had the flexibility of programming 
and a rapid process of learning and changing course, enabling it to hit the moving 
targets in a very dynamic situation. It also had room for experimentation and for 
cross programme learning that allowed it to share knowledge and experience of what 
works in which settings. The rigorous monitoring and evaluation framework was 
effective as it allowed lessons learnt to be shared among partners. The programme 
design was sufficiently flexible to allow  innovative programming to thrive, and as 
well as providing an interface with state institutions to allow them to learn and adopt 
practices and programmes that the state felt would work, thereby providing the PRP 
with good scope for an exit strategy. 
 
Recommendations  
In light of the findings of this study, the following recommendations are suggested. 
For Government: 
Engage in policy dialogue with all relevant stakeholders, so as to ensure sound, 
harmonised pro-poor policies and practices, based on national priorities, scientific 
evidence and practical experiences.   
Engage in partnerships with NGOs, donors and the private sector in the 
implementation of pro-poor policies and strategies.  
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For Donors  
Have a mechanism that allows for sharing of information and experiences, 
techniques and technologies that work, thereby maintaining synergies between 
donors and other stakeholders including government, to harmonise delivery, prevent 
overlaps and gaps.   
Developmental assistance which is flexible and which embraces the mosaics of  
livelihoods will give people and communities opportunities to raise their incomes so 
that they can have a stronger asset base, have more opportunities and capabilities, 
and be less vulnerable and more resilient to shocks. 
Promote smallholder farmers to be more productive with: inputs, equipment, 
irrigation, improved markets and market linkages, adding value, diversification.  
 
For the Private Sector 
Engage with the government, donors and civil society so that Corporate Social 
Responsibility efforts and initiatives are targeted towards poverty reduction, and 
resilience, and are informed by identified priorities and practices.   
 
For Research Institutions 
Carry out in-depth case studies and collection of poverty narratives to understand: 
the multi-dimensional nature of poverty and what drives poverty and how individual 
cycles can be broken.     
Undertake longitudinal research and panel surveys to understand the dynamic 
nature of poverty and how people move into and out of poverty.  
Conduct follow up research to determine longer term impacts of assistance 
interventions and development programmes to establish what works and has impact 
in the long term.  This will assist future interventions to be designed to have greater 
impact and be more sustainable. 
Undertake participatory action research, which involves communities who can 
directly benefit from the intervention.  
Carry out research on information on gaps such as hidden livelihood strategies, 
gendered risk factors, youth dynamics, impacts of AIDS orphans and strategies for 
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Appendix 1: Scope of this Work 
Although the key focus of this work is to understand the drivers of chronic poverty 
(understood as long duration poverty) in Zimbabwe, doing such analysis necessarily 
means attention has to be paid to other forms of poverty. Much of this work will be 
based on an analysis of what we can learn from the programming work done through 
the PRP.  
The Protracted Relief Programme (PRP) was launched in Zimbabwe by the UK 
Department for International Development (DFID) in 2004. This first phase lasted 
until 2008, when the second phase (2008-12) was commissioned. The second phase 
has evolved to be a multi-donor funded programme, financed by Australian Aid 
(AusAID), Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), the European Union 
(EU), the Embassy of the Kingdom of Netherlands (EKN), the Norwegian Agency for 
Development (NORAD), UK Department for International Development (DFID) and 
the World Bank. Funding for the current phase amounts to over USD 130 million. It 
has reached over two million vulnerable people throughout Zimbabwe. In its last 12 
months the programme is being implemented by 23 International and local national 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) plus six Innovation Fund partners. GRM 
International, a consultant company, is responsible for management and 
coordination.    
The PRP aimed to reduce extreme poverty in Zimbabwe and through various 
programming interventions sought to prevent suffering and at the same time build 
the capacity of beneficiary households to graduate out of poverty. This was done 
through a mixture of emergency, recovery and development interventions. The 
balance, in terms of resource allocation, between emergency, recovery and 
development, has been changing with the evolving context in Zimbabwe. In the 
current phase the interventions are now more developmental, building the 
sustainability and resilience of the livelihood systems of the very poor people in 
Zimbabwe. Phase I reached 1.5 million people. Phase II helped to increase coverage 
to at least 2 million in both urban and rural areas.  
Aims and objectives 
This consultancy entitled “Drivers of chronic poverty in Zimbabwe: What have we 
learned?” aims to identify and document PRP experiences with the changing poverty 
landscape in Zimbabwe. It incorporates a review of the lessons that PRP and its 












Mapping of Objectives, Questions and Data Sources 
 
Objective Questions Sources of Data 
Identify and Analyse the nature, 
extent, patterns and dynamics of 
poverty in Zimbabwe 
 What do the data tell us 
about poverty in Rural and 
Urban Zimbabwe 
 How has poverty changed 
over time in rural and urban 
areas? 
 What are the local definitions 
of poverty in rural and urban 
areas? 
PRP LIME data and Reports 
ZimVac 
 Poverty Assessment Study Surveys 
(PASS) 
ICES 
MZF 2011 Data 
Primary Ground Truthing 
MDGs Monitoring Reports 
Mercy Corps 
Analyse the drivers of poverty in 
Zimbabwe and how these have 
shaped humanitarian and 
Government of Zimbabwe policy 
responses 
 What are the localised drivers 
of poverty in rural and urban 
areas?  
 What are the common drivers 
of poverty across all 
geographical and social 
sectors? 
 How have policy responses 
over time been shaped 
drivers of poverty? 
PRP LIME  
ZimVac 
 Poverty Assessment Study Surveys 
MZF 2011 Data 
ICES 
DHS 
Primary Ground Truthing 
MDGs Monitoring Reports 
Kinsey Data Base 
Identify and analyse strategies that 
have been successfully employed 
to create wealth opportunities for 
the poor 
 What are the local wealth 
creation opportunities in rural 
and urban areas? 
 What wealth creation 
strategies can be promoted to 
counteract the effects of the 
identified poverty drivers 
PRP LIME  
ZimVac 
MDGs Monitoring Reports 
Government Policy Documents 
Primary Ground Truthing 
Structured Interviews with 
stakeholders 
Review of International 
Experiences in Developing 
Countries 
Identify the programming and 
policy implications of the emerging 
poverty trends in Zimbabwe 
 What are the programming 
and policy implications for 
future planning towards 
poverty reduction in rural and 
urban areas? 






This was essentially a desk study that sought to comprehensively analyse the 
lessons from the PRP while situating this experience within the knowledge pool of 
what else we know (from other data sources and literature) about the drivers of 
poverty in Zimbabwe. The work drew mainly from the PRP- LIME data and where 
possible complemented this with analysis of other available data (like DHS; MZF; 
PASS; ICES). The analysis of the data and documents was be complemented by 
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some semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders.  Some limited ground 
truthing consisting mainly of two focus group sessions – one rural and one urban 
especially covering some of the beneficiaries was also done.  
The work proceeded through three key phases as follows 
Phase 1 
Review of LIME Data and Reports 
This involved an analysis of data and documents such as monitoring & evaluation 
reports. This phase used mostly valorised data although in some instances use was 
made of raw data from the MZF survey and ZIMVAC. This was dome to generate 
exemplars necessary to illustrate key points of argument. The review provided 
important background information to the research as well as a deeper understanding 
of the Household Economy Approach and its impact. This form of analysis provided 
the report with headline figures that underpin the core arguments made.. 
Phase 2  
Situating the LIME Data within context of What is known and What has been 
Learnt 
The aim was to situate the LIME evidence within the broader poverty knowledge 
pool. It reviewed evidence from the PRP and other published data and reports and 
analysed patterns emerging from research and programme interventions in 
Zimbabwe. During this phase we also reviewed official policy and programming 
efforts by the different stakeholders and drew conclusions on how these have 
influenced the poverty reduction landscape. 
Phase 3 
Interviews and Ground Truthing.  
Apart from reviewing secondary data some interviews and consultative meetings 
with key stakeholders were conducted. The main objective was to gather data on 
programming efforts and emerging consensus on outcomes. Semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with 17 key informants. Some limited ground truthing was 
also carried out in Musana and Mufakose. This consisted mainly of two focus group 
sessions – one rural and one urban especially covering some of the beneficiaries of 
PRP. In much of the poverty analysis work, ground truthing is a standard way of 
checking that findings of a desk study chime with the reality on the ground. Talking to 
and checking facts with beneficiaries helped to strengthen the confidence with which 
firm conclusions could be drawn. Methodologically it also balanced out the views of 
the elite (from semi-structured interviews) with those of the ordinary beneficiaries. 
 
Phase 4 
Final Write Up and Review 
During this phase a draft report was written and put out to review. Feedback 
received was taken into account in preparing the final report. 
